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Introduction
In the year 1900, Belgium and the Philippines had 
more or less the same population, around 7 million 
people. By the year 2000, the population of the 
Western European monarchy had grown to 10 mil-
lion citizens, while the South East Asian republic at 
the turn of the century already counted 76 million 
citizens. The population of Belgium has since then 
exceeded 11 million citizens, but it is unlikely that 
this number will rise to 12 million by the year 2050. 
The population of the Philippines on the other hand 
will continue to grow to a staggering 127 million 
citizens by 2050, according to the demographic pro-
jections of the United Nations (UN 2013).
The demographic growth rate of the Philippines 
around the turn of the century (2% a year) has 
 already created enormous challenges and is clearly 
unsustainable in the long term: such growth implies 
a doubling of the population every 35 years as a 
consequence of which there would be 152 million 
people by 2035, 304 million by 2070, and so on. 
Nobody expects such a growth to actually occur. 
This contribution will discuss the more realistic 
 scenarios for the future. 
Even the rather modest Belgian demographic 
growth rate around the turn of this century (0.46%) 
is not sustainable in the long term. In any case, it 
exceeds by far the average growth rate of the human 
species (homo sapiens sapiens) that arose in Africa 
some 200.000 years ago. Today, earth is inhabited 
by some 7 billion people. To achieve this number in 
200.000 years, the average yearly growth rate over 
this term should have been around 0.011% annually 
(so 11 extra human beings per 1.000 human beings 
already living on earth). The current Belgian growth 
rate would imply that our country would have grown 
to 7 billion in less than 1500 years.
The point of this story is that the current growth 
numbers are historically very exceptional and un-
tenable in the long term. The demographic growth 
rates are indeed on the decline worldwide and this 
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the population there had started to grow at a histori-
cally unseen rate. More specifically the proletariat 
had grown immensely and that worried the intellec-
tuals and the elite. Year after year, new demograph-
ic growth records were recorded. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the number 
of 1 billion people was exceeded for the first time in 
history. Subsequently growth accelerated and the 
number of 2 billion people was already surpassed 
around 1920. By 1960, another billion had been 
added, in 40 instead of 120 years time. And it con-
tinued to go even faster: 4 billion by 1974, 5 billion 
by 1987, 6 billion by 1999 and 7 billion in 2011 
(Fig. 1). 
This will certainly not stop at the current 7 bil-
lion. According to the most recent projections by 
the United Nations, the number of 8 billion will 
probably be exceeded by 2025, and around 2045 
there will be more than 9 billion people1. The  further 
paper will attempt to explain some of the mecha-
nisms behind that process. That doesn’t change the 
fact, however, that the growth remains extraordi-
narily high and the decline in some regions very 
slow. This is especially the case in Sub Saharan Af-
rica. In absolute numbers, the world population will 
continue to grow anyway for quite some time as a 
result of demographic inertia. This too will be fur-
ther clarified in this paper. 
The evolution of the world population in num-
bers
In order to be sustainable, the long term growth rate 
of the population should not differ much from 0%. 
That is because a growth rate exceeding 0% has ex-
ponential implications. In simple terms: if a combi-
nation of birth and growth figures only appears to 
cause a modest population growth initially, then this 
seems to imply an explosive growth in the longer 
term. 
Thomas R. Malthus already acquired this point of 
view by the end of the 18th century. In his famous 
“Essay on the Principle of Population” (first edition 
in 1789), Malthus argues justly that in time the 
growth of the population will inevitably slow down, 
either by an increase of the death rate or by a de-
crease of the birth rate. On a local scale, migration 
also plays an important role. 
It is no coincidence that Malthus’ essay appeared 
in England at the end of the 18th century. After all, 
Source: Livi-Bacci (2001, p. 27) and UN World Population data.
Fig. 1. — Historical growth of the world population since year 0
(1) Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this paragraph 
are based on the United Nations World Population Prospects, 
the 2012 Revision, http://esa.un.org/wpp/. Concerning projec-
tions for the future, I reported the results of the Medium Vari-
ant. Apart from this variant, there are also high and low variants 
(those relying on scenarios implying respectively an extremely 
high and extremely low growth of the population) and a variant 
in which the fertility rates are fixed at the current levels. It is 
expected that the actual number will be somewhere between the 
highest and lowest variant and will be closest to the medium 
variant. That’s why I only report this latter value. 
van bavel.indd   282 20/12/13   09:50
 THe WORlD POPUlaTiOn eXPlOSiOn – Van BaVel 283
2.2 billion inhabitants in 2050 or 24% of the world 
population. The proportion of Europe, on the other 
hand, is evolving in the opposite direction: from 
22% of the world population in 1950, over 11% in 
2010 to an expected mere 8% in 2050. The popula-
tion of Latin America has grown and is growing 
rapidly in absolute terms, but because of the strong 
growth in Asia and especially Africa, the relative 
proportion of the Latin American population is 
hardly increasing (at most from 6 to 8%). The pro-
portion of the population in North America, finally, 
has decreased slightly from 7 to 5% of the world 
population. 
What these figures mainly come down to in prac-
tice is that the population size in especially the poor 
countries is increasing at an unprecedented rate. At 
the moment, more than 5.7 billion people, or more 
than 80% of humanity, are living in what the UN 
categorise as a developing country. By 2050, that 
number would – according to the projections – have 
increased to 8 billion people or 86% of the world 
population. Within this group of developing coun-
tries, the group of least developed countries, the 
poorest countries so to speak, is growing strongly: 
from 830 million now, up to an expected 1.7 billion 
in 2050. This comprises very poor countries such as 
Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Niger or Togo in Africa; 
one looks into the future, the more uncertain these 
figures become, and with demography on a world 
scale one must always take into account a margin of 
error of a couple of tens of millions. But according 
to all plausible scenarios, the number of 9 billion 
will be exceeded by 2050. 
Demographic growth was and is not equally dis-
tributed around the globe. The population explosion 
first occurred on a small scale and with a relatively 
moderate intensity in Europe and America, more or 
less between 1750 and 1950. From 1950 on, a much 
more substantial and intensive population explosion 
started to take place in Asia, Latin America and 
 Africa (Fig. 2). Asia already represented over 55% 
of the world population in 1950 with its 1.4 billion 
citizens and by the year 2010 this had increased to 
4.2 billion people or 60%. Of those people, more 
than 1.3 billion live in China and 1.2 billion in In-
dia, together accounting for more than one third of 
the world population. 
In the future, the proportion of Asia will come 
down and that of Africa will increase. Africa was 
populated by some 230 million people around 1950, 
or 9% of the world population. In 2010 there were 
already more than 1 billion Africans or 15% of the 
world population. According to UN projections, Af-
rica will continue to grow at a spectacular rate up to 
Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted line in the figure, are Median Variant 
projections.
Fig. 2. — Evolution of the population size by continent, 1950-2050*
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failed harvests and famine, or a combination of 
both. As a consequence of better hygiene and a bet-
ter transportation infrastructure (for one, the canals 
and roads constructed by Austria in the 18th centu-
ry), amongst other reasons, crisis mortality became 
less and less frequent. Later on in the 19th century, 
child survival began to improve. Vaccination 
against smallpox for example led to an eradication 
of the disease, with the last European smallpox pan-
demic dating from 1871. This way, not only the 
years of crisis mortality became less frequent, but 
also the average death rate decreased, from an aver-
age 30 deaths per 1000 inhabitants in the beginning 
of the 19th century to around 15 deaths per 1000 
citizens by the beginning of the 20th century. In the 
meantime, the birth rate however stayed at its previ-
ous, high level of 30-35 births per 1000 inhabitants.
The death rate went down but the birth rate still 
didn’t: this caused a large growth in population. It 
was only near the end of the nineteenth century (a 
bit earlier in some countries, later in others) that 
married couples in large numbers started to reduce 
their number of children. By the middle of the 20th 
century, the middle class ideal of a two children 
household had gained enormous popularity and in-
fluence. The reaction by the Church, for example in 
the encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968), came much 
too late to bring this evolution to a halt. 
As a consequence of widespread family planning 
– made even easier in the sixties by modern hor-
monal contraceptives – the birth rate started declin-
ing as well and the population tended back towards 
zero growth. Nowadays the end of this transition 
process has been more than achieved in all Europe-
an countries, because the fertility has been below 
replacement level for several decades (the replace-
ment level is the fertility level that would in the long 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Myanmar in Asia; and 
Haiti in the Caribbean. 
The growth of the world population goes hand in 
hand with global urbanisation: while around the 
year 1950 less than 30% of people lived in the cit-
ies, this proportion has increased to more than 50%. 
It is expected that this proportion will continue to 
grow to two thirds around 2050. Latin America is 
the most urbanised continent (84%), closely fol-
lowed by North America (82%) and at a distance by 
Europe (73%). The population density has increased 
intensely especially in the poorest countries: from 9 
people per square km in 1950 to 40 people per 
square km in 2010 (an increase by 330%) in the 
poorest countries, while this figure in the rich coun-
tries increased from 15 to 23 people per square km 
(a 50% growth). In Belgium, population density is 
358 people per square km and in the Netherlands 
400 people per square km; in Rwanda this number 
is 411, in the Palestinian regions 666 and in Bangla-
desh an astonishing 1050.
Although the world population will continue to 
grow in absolute figures for some time – a following 
paragraph will explain why – the growth rate in per-
centages in all large world regions is decreasing. In 
the richer countries, the yearly growth rate has al-
ready declined to below 0.3%. On a global scale, the 
yearly growth rate of more than 2% at the peak 
around 1965 decreased to around 1% now. A fur-
ther decline to less than 0.5% by 2050 is expected. 
In the world’s poorest countries, the demographic 
growth is still largest: at present around 2.2%. For 
these countries, a considerable decrease is expected, 
but the projected growth rate would not fall below 
1.5% before 2050. This means, as mentioned above, 
a massive growth of the population in absolute fig-
ures in the world’s poorest countries. 
Causes of the explosion: the demographic transi-
tion
The cause of, first, the acceleration and, then, the 
deceleration in population growth is the modern de-
mographic transition: an increasingly growing 
group of countries has experienced a transition from 
relatively high to low birth and death rates, or is still 
in the process of experiencing this. It is this transi-
tion that is causing the modern population explo-
sion. Figure 3 is a schematic and strongly simplified 
representation of the modern demographic transi-
tion.
In Europe, the modern demographic transition 
started to take place in the middle of the 18th centu-
ry. Until then, years of extremely high death rates 
were quite frequent. Extremely high crisis mortality 
could be the consequence of epidemic diseases or 
Fig. 3. — Schematic representation of the modern  demographic 
transition.
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rate (the average number of children per woman) in 
the first place and population momentum in the sec-
ond. The latter is a concept I will later on discuss in 
more detail. The role of the population momentum 
is usually overlooked in the popular debates, but is 
of utmost importance in understanding the further 
evolution of the world population. Population mo-
mentum is the reason why we are as good as certain 
that the world population will continue to grow for 
a while. The other factor, the evolution of the fertil-
ity rate, is much more uncertain but of critical im-
portance in the long term. The rate at which the fur-
ther growth of the world population can be slowed 
down is primarily dependent on the extent to which 
the fertility rates will continue to decline. I will fur-
ther elaborate on this notion in the next paragraph. 
After that, I will clarify the notion of population 
momentum.
Declining fertility
Fertility is going down everywhere in the world, but 
it’s going down particularly slowly in Africa. A fur-
ther decline remains uncertain there. Figure 4 shows 
the evolution per world region between 1950 and 
2010, plus the projected evolution until 2050. The 
numbers before 2010 illustrate three things. First of 
all, on all continents there is a decline going on. 
Secondly, this decline is not equal everywhere. And 
thirdly: the differences between the continents re-
main large in some cases. Asia and Latin America 
have seen a similar decline in fertility: from 5.9 
children per woman in 1950 to 2.5 at the start of the 
21st century. Europe and North America had already 
gone through the largest part of their demographic 
transition by the 1950’s. Their fertility level has 
been below replacement levels for years. Africa has 
indeed seen a global decrease of fertility, but the av-
erage number of children is still at an alarmingly 
high level: the fertility merely decreased from 6.7 to 
5.1 children per woman. 
These continental averages hide a huge under-
lying diversity in fertility paths. Figure 5 attempts to 
illustrate this for a number of countries. Firstly let 
us consider two African countries: the Congo and 
Niger. As was often the case in Europe in the 
19th century, fertility was first on the rise before it 
started declining. In the Congo this decrease was 
more extensive, from around 6 children in 1980 to 
4 children per woman today, and a further decline to 
term lead to a birth rate identical to the death rate, if 
there would be no migration)2.
That the population explosion in the developing 
countries since the second half of the 20th century 
was so much more intense and massive, is a conse-
quence of the fact that in those countries, the pro-
cess of demographic transition occurred to a much 
more extreme extent and on a much larger scale. On 
the one hand, mortality decreased faster than in Eu-
rope. After all, in Europe the decline in mortality 
was the result of a gradual understanding of the im-
portance of hygiene and afterwards the develop-
ment of new medical insights. These insights of 
course already existed at the start of the demograph-
ic transitions in Asian, Latin American and African 
regions, whereby the life expectancy in these re-
gions could grow faster. On the other hand, the total 
fertility – the average number of children per wom-
an – at the start of the transition was a lot higher in 
many poor regions than it initially was in Europe. 
For South Korea, Brasil and the Congo, for exam-
ple, the total fertility rate shortly after the Second 
World War (at the start of their demographic transi-
tion) is estimated to be 6 children per woman. In 
Belgium this number was close to 4.5 children per 
woman by the middle of the nineteenth century. In 
some developing regions, the fertility and birth rate 
decreased moderately to very fast, but in other re-
gions this decline took off at an exceptionally slug-
gish pace – this will be further explained later on. 
As a consequence of these combinations of factors, 
in most of these countries the population explosion 
was much larger than it had been in most European 
countries.
Scenarios for the future
Nonetheless, the process of demographic transition 
has reached its second phase in almost all countries 
in the world, namely the phase of declining fertility 
and birth rates. In a lot of Asian and Latin American 
countries, the entire transition has taken place and 
the fertility level is around or below the replacement 
level. South Korea for example is currently at 1.2 
children per woman and is one of the countries with 
the lowest fertility levels in the world. In Iran and 
Brasil the fertility level is currently more or less 
equal to Belgium’s, that is 1.8 to 1.9 children per 
woman. 
Crucial to the future evolution of the population 
is the further evolution of the birth rate. Scenarios 
for the future evolution of the size and age of the 
population differ according to the hypotheses con-
cerning the further evolution of the birth rate. The 
evolution of the birth rate is in turn dependent on 
two things: the further evolution of the total fertility 
(2) In demography, the term « fertility » refers to the actual 
number of live births per women. By contrast, the term fecun-
dity refers to reproductive capacity (irrespective of actual child-
bearing), see Habbema et al. (2004).
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countries have the same total fertility, below the re-
placement level. 
Child mortality, education and family planning
Which factors cause the average number of children 
to go down? The literature concerning explanations 
for the decrease in fertility is vast and complex, but 
two factors emerge as crucial in this process: educa-
tion and child survival.
Considering child survival first: countries com-
bining intensive birth control with very high child 
mortality are simply non-existent. The statistical as-
sociation between the level of child mortality and 
fertility is very tight and strong: in countries with 
high child mortality, fertility is high, and vice versa. 
This statistical correlation is very strong because 
the causal relation goes in both directions; with 
quick succession of children and therefore a lot of 
children to take care for, the chances of survival for 
the infants are lower than in those families with 
only a limited number of children to take care of – 
this is a fortiori the case where infrastructure for 
health care is lacking. A high fertility level thus 
contributes to a high child mortality. And in the 
other direction: where survival chances of children 
improve, the fertility will go down because even 
those households with a lower number of children 
just below three is expected in the next thirty years. 
Niger is the country where the fertility level remains 
highest: from 7 it first rose to an average of just be-
low 8 children per woman in the middle of the 
1980’s, before decreasing to just above 6.5 today. 
For the next decades a decline to 4 children per 
woman is expected. But that is not at all certain: it is 
dependent on circumstances that will be further ex-
plained in a moment. The demographic transition is 
after all not a law of nature but the result of human 
actions and human institutions. 
Around 1950, Pakistan and Iran had more or less 
the same fertility level as Niger, but both countries 
have seen a considerable decline in the meantime. 
In Pakistan the level decreased slowly to the current 
level of 3 children per woman. In Iran the fertility 
decreased more abruptly, faster and deeper to below 
the replacement level – Iran today has one of the 
lowest fertility levels in the world, and a further de-
cline is expected. The Iranian Revolution of 1978 
played a crucial role in the history of Iran (Abassi-
Shavazi et al., 2009): it brought better education and 
health care, two essential ingredients for birth con-
trol. 
Brasil was also one of the countries with very 
high fertility in the 1950’s – higher than the Congo, 
for example. The decrease started earlier than in 
Iran but happened more gradually. Today both 
Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted lines, are medium variant projections.
Fig. 4. — Evolution of the total fertility rate by world region: 1950-2050
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tomorrow, next week and next month, instead of 
living for the day. This attitude is necessary for ef-
fective birth control. Thirdly, education also in-
creases the potential for effective contraception, 
because birth control doesn’t just happen, especially 
not when efficient family planning facilities are not 
or hardly accessible or when there are opposing cul-
tural or family values. 
The influence of education on birth control has 
been demonstrated in a vast number of studies 
(James et al., 2012). It starts with primary educa-
tion, but an even larger effect can be attained by 
investment in secondary education (Cohen, 2008). 
In a country like Niger, for example, women who 
didn’t finish primary school have on average 7.8 
children. Women who did finish primary school 
have on average 6.7 children, while women who 
finished secondary school “only” have 4.6 children 
(Fig. 6). The fertility of Niger would be a lot lower 
if more women could benefit from education. The 
tragedy of that country is that too many people fall 
in the category of those without a degree of primary 
school, with all its demographic consequences.
One achieves with education therefore a plural 
beneficial demographic effect on top of the impor-
tant objective of human emancipation in itself. All 
this is of course not always true but depends on 
which form of “education”; I assume that we’re 
talking about education that teaches people the 
have increasing confidence in having descendants 
in the long term. 
It is crucial to understand that the decline in child 
mortality in the demographic transition always pre-
cedes the decline in fertility. Men, women and fam-
ilies cannot be convinced of the benefits of birth 
control if they don’t have confidence in the survival 
chances of their children. Better health care is there-
fore essential, and a lack of good health care is one 
of the reasons for a persistently high fertility in a 
country like Niger.
Education is another factor that can cause a de-
cline in fertility. This is probably the most impor-
tant factor, not just because education is an impor-
tant humanitarian goal in itself (apart from the 
demographic effects), but also because with educa-
tion one can kill two birds with one stone: education 
causes more birth control but also better child sur-
vival (recently clearly demonstrated by Smith-
Greenaway (2013), which in its turn will lead to bet-
ter birth control. The statistical correlation between 
level of education and level of fertility is therefore 
very strong. 
Firstly, education enhances the motivation for 
birth control: if parents invest in the education of 
their children, they will have fewer children, as has 
been demonstrated. Secondly, education promotes a 
more forward-looking lifestyle: it will lead people 
to think on a somewhat longer term, to think about 
Source: UN World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision; the data after 2010, with dotted lines, are medium variant projections.
Fig. 5. — Evolution of the total fertility rate in some countries between 1950 and 2010, and projected evolution until 2050
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is therefore essential, and education can play an im-
portant role in that process as well. 
Population momentum
Even if all the people would suddenly practice birth 
control much more than is currently considered pos-
sible, the world population would still continue to 
grow for a while. This is the consequence of popula-
tion momentum, a notion that refers to the phenom-
enon of demographic inertia, comparable to the 
phenomenon of momentum and inertia in the field 
of physics. Demographic growth is like a moving 
train: even when you turn off the engine, the move-
ment will continue for a little while. 
The power and direction of population momentum 
is dependent on the age structure of the population. 
Compare the population pyramids of Egypt and 
Germany (Fig. 7). The one for Egypt has a pyramidal 
shape indeed, but the one for Germany looks more 
like an onion. As a consequence of high birth rates 
in the previous decades, the largest groups of Egyp-
tians are to be found below the age of forty; the 
younger, the more voluminous the generation. Even 
if the current and future generations of Egyptians 
would limit their fertility strongly (as is indeed the 
case), the birth rate in Egypt would still continue to 
knowledge and skills to better take control of their 
own destiny. 
It is one thing to get people motivated to practice 
birth control but obtaining actual effective contra-
ception is quite another matter. Information con-
cerning the efficient use of contraceptives and in-
creasing the accessibility and affordability of 
contraceptives can therefore play an important role. 
There are an estimated 215 million women who 
would want to have contraception but don’t have 
the means (UNFPA, 2011). Investments in services 
to help with family planning are absolutely neces-
sary and could already have great results in this 
group of women. But it’s no use to put the cart be-
fore the horse: if there is no intention to practice 
birth control, propaganda for and accessibility of 
contraception will hardly have any effect, as was 
demonstrated in the past. In Europe the lion’s share 
of the decline in fertility was realized with tradition-
al methods, before the introduction of hormonal 
contraception in the sixties. There is often a prob-
lem of lack of motivation for birth control on the 
one hand, as a result of high child mortality and low 
schooling rates, and a lack of power in women who 
may be motivated to limit fertility but are confront-
ed with male resistance on the other (Blanc, 2011; 
Do and Kurimoto, 2012). Empowerment of women 
Source: Cohen 2008.
Fig. 6. — Association between level of education and total fertility rate in some poor countries
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Poverty and famine
The Malthusian line of thought continues to leave 
an important mark on the debate regarding the 
 association between population growth and  poverty: 
Malthus saw an excessive population growth as an 
important cause of poverty and famine. Rightfully 
this Malthusian vision has been criticized a lot. One 
must after all take the reverse causal relation into 
account as well: poverty and the related social 
 circumstances (like a lack of education and good 
health care for children) contribute to high popula-
tion growth as well. 
Concerning famine: the production of food has 
grown faster since 1960 than the world population 
has, so nowadays the amount of food produced per 
person exceeds that which existed before the 
 population explosion (Lam, 2011). The problem of 
famine isn’t as much an insufficient food produc-
tion as it is a lack of fair distribution (and a lack of 
sustainable production, but that’s another issue). 
Often regions with famine have ecological conditions 
permitting sufficient production of food, provided 
the necessary investments in human resources and 
technology are made. The most important cause of 
famine is therefore not the population explosion. 
Famine is primarily a consequence of unequal 
 distribution of food, which in turn is caused by 
 social-economic inequality, lack of democracy and 
(civil) war. 
Poverty and famine usually have mainly political 
and institutional causes, not demographic ones. The 
Malthusian vision, that sees the population explo-
sion as the root of all evil, therefore has to be cor-
rected (Fig. 8). Rapid population growth can indeed 
hinder economical development and can thus pave 
the way for poverty. But this is only part of the 
rise for quite some time, just because year after year 
more and more potential mothers and fathers reach 
the fertile ages. Egypt therefore clearly has a growth 
momentum.
Germany on the other hand has a negative or 
shrinking momentum: even if the younger genera-
tions of Germans would have a larger num ber of 
children than the generation of their own parents, 
the birth rate in Germany would still continue to de-
crease because fewer and fewer potential mothers 
and fathers reach the fertile ages. 
The population momentum on a global scale is 
 positive: even if fertility would decrease overnight 
to the replacement level, the world population 
would continue to grow with 40% (from 7 billion to 
9.8 billion). Only the rich countries have a shrinking 
momentum, that is -3%. For Europe the momentum 
is -7%. The population momentum for the poorest 
countries in the world is +44%, that of Sub Saharan 
Africa +46% (Espenshade et al., 2011). 
Consequences of the population explosion
The concerns about the consequences of population 
explosion started in the sixties. Milestone publica-
tions were the 1968 book The Population bomb by 
biologist Paul Ehrlich, the report of the Club of 
Rome from 1972 (The Limits to Growth) and the 
first World Population Plan of Action of the UN in 
1974 among others.
In the world population debate, the general con-
cerns involve mainly three interconnected conse-
quences of the population explosion: 1) the growing 
poverty in the world and famine; 2) the exhaustion 
and pollution of natural resources essential to hu-
man survival; and 3) the migration pressure from 
the poor South to the rich North (Van Bavel, 2004). 
Source: US Census Bureau, international database.
Fig. 7. — Population pyramids of Egypt (left) and Germany (right)
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and North America together, over 1 billion. But 
the total ecological footprint of Europeans and 
 Americans is many times higher than that of Africans 
(Ewing et al., 2010). Less than 18% of the world 
population is responsible for over 50% of the global 
carbon dioxide emission (Chakravarty et al., 2009).
If we are therefore concerned about the impact of 
the world population on the environment, we can do 
something about it immediately by tackling our 
own overconsumption: it’s something we can con-
trol and it has an immediate effect. In contrast, we 
know of the population growth that it will continue 
for some time anyhow, even if people in poor coun-
tries would practice much more birth control than 
we consider possible at present. 
Migration
The population explosion has created an increasing 
migration pressure from the South to the North – 
and there is also important migration within and be-
tween countries in the South. But here as well the 
message is: the main responsibility doesn’t lie with 
the population growth but with economic  inequality. 
The primary motive for migration was and is 
 economic disparity: people migrate from regions 
with no or badly paid labour and a low standard of 
living to other regions, where one hopes to find 
work and a higher standard of living (Massey et al., 
1993; Hooghe et al., 2008; IMO, 2013). Given the 
permanent population growth and economical 
 inequality, a further increasing migration pressure is 
to be expected, irrespective of the national policies 
adopted.
It is sometimes expected that economic growth 
and increasing incomes in the South will slow down 
the migration pressure, but that remains to be seen. 
After all, it isn’t usually the poorest citizens in 
 developing countries that migrate to rich countries. 
It is rather the affluent middle class in poor coun-
tries that have the means to send their sons and 
daughters to the North – an investment that can raise 
a lot of money via remittances to the families in the 
country of origin (IMO, 2013). There is after all a 
considerable cost attached to migration, in terms of 
money and human capital. Not everyone can bear 
those costs: to migrate you need brains, guts and 
money. With growing economic development in 
poor countries, an initial increase in migration 
 pressure from those countries would be expected; 
the association between social-economic  development 
 story. As mentioned, poverty is also an underlying 
cause of rapid population growth. Social factors are 
at the base of both poverty and population growth. 
It’s those social factors that require our interven-
tion: via investments in education and (reproduc-
tive) health care. 
Impact on the environment
The impact of the population explosion on the envi-
ronment is unquestionably high, but the size of the 
population represents only one aspect of this. In this 
regard it can be useful to keep in mind the simple 
I=PAT scheme: the ecological footprint or impact 
on the environment (I) can be regarded as the prod-
uct of the size of the population (P), the prosperity 
or consumption level (A for affluence) and the tech-
nology used (T). The relationship between each of 
these factors is more complex than the I=PAT 
scheme suggests, but in any case the footprint I of a 
population of 1000 people is for example dependent 
on how many of those people drive a car instead of 
a bike, and of the emission per car of the vehicle 
fleet concerned. 
The ecological footprint of the world population 
has increased tremendously the past decades and the 
growth of the world population has obviously 
played an important role in this. The other factors in 
the I=PAT scheme have however played a relative-
ly bigger role than the demographic factor P. The 
considerable increase in the Chinese ecological 
footprint of the past decades for example, is more a 
consequence of the increased consumption of meat 
than of population growth (Peters et al., 2007; Liu et 
al., 2008). The carbon dioxide emission of China 
grew by 82% between 1990 and 2003, while the 
population only increased by 11% in that same pe-
riod. A similar story exists for India: the population 
grew by less than 23% between 1990 and 2003, 
while the emission of carbon dioxide increased by 
more than 83% (Chakravarty et al., 2009). The 
 consumption of water and meat in the world is 
 increasing more rapidly than the population3. The 
consumption of water per person is for example 
threefold higher in the US than in China (Hoekstra 
and Chapagain, 2007). The African continent has at 
present the same number of inhabitants as Europe 
Fig. 8. — Connections between social factors, poverty and 
population growth.
(3) See http://www.unwater.org/water-cooperation-2013/
water-cooperation/facts-and-figures/
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and emigration is not linearly negative but follows 
the shape of a J turned upside down: more emigration 
at the start of economic development and a  decline 
in emigration only with further development (De 
Haas, 2007). 
7 Billion and counting… What is to be done?
A world population that needed some millennia 
 before reaching the number of 1 billion people, but 
then added some billions more after 1920 in less 
than a century: the social, cultural, economic and 
ecological consequences of such an evolution are so 
complex that they can lead to fear and indifference 
at the same time. What kind of constructive reaction 
is possible and productive in view of such an 
 enormous issue? 
First of all: we need to invest in education and 
health care in Africa and elsewhere, not just as a 
humanitarian target per se but also because it will 
encourage the spread of birth control. Secondly, we 
need to encourage and support the empowerment of 
women, not just via education but also via services 
for reproductive health. This has triple desirable re-
sults for demographics: it will lead to more and 
more effective birth control, which in itself has a 
positive effect on the survival of children, which in 
turn again facilitates birth control. 
Thirdly: because of the positive population 
 momentum, the world population will certainly 
continue to grow in absolute figures, even though 
the yearly growth rate in percentages is already on 
the decline for several years. The biggest contribu-
tion we could make therefore, with an immediate 
favourable impact for ourselves and the rest of the 
world, is to change our consumption pattern and 
deal with the structural overconsumption of the 
world’s richest countries.
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